ROJBIN DENIZ

News Centre — The agreement signed on 29 January 2026 between the Syrian Democratic Forces (QSD) and the Syrian interim government is regarded as the first tangible step towards beginning the process of integrating autonomous institutions in North-East Syria. If this process is to be considered a first step within the framework of building mutual trust and implementing specific measures along the path of integration, one must first examine the extent to which the 29 January agreement has been implemented.

The first phase of the agreement was based on a mutual ceasefire and efforts to transform it into a lasting peace. Significant progress appears to have been made in this regard. Over the past five months, there has been no clash between the two parties that could be described as warlike. However, the silencing of weapons does not necessarily mean the achievement of comprehensive and lasting peace.

The second phase of the agreement was based on the exchange of prisoners, and this process was expected to be completed within the first month. However, Hay'at Tahrir al‑Sham's use of prisoners as a political tool prolonged the process.

Nevertheless, thanks to popular pressure and the efforts of families, according to official data, 1,050 prisoners have so far been released in six batches.

The third phase of the agreement consisted of the return of displaced persons to their original areas.

The Return to Afrin and New Balances

One of the most notable outcomes of the 29 January agreement is Turkey’s withdrawal from some areas it had previously occupied, and the emergence of a new ground for cooperation based on security considerations. Within this framework, the return of the displaced population of Afrin to their lands has begun gradually and without any armed clashes. With the eighth batch, the return process to Afrin has been completed.

After the attack launched by the Turkish occupation and its mercenaries in 2018, Afrin came under the control of radical Salafi factions supported by the Turkish state. At the beginning of 2025, the influence of some groups affiliated with the Hay'at Tahrir al‑Sham administration began to appear in the region. After the recent agreement, a new process has been launched aimed at the safe return of the indigenous population to Afrin.

Although problems of control and security persist in some villages, the general climate appears more positive compared to previous years. Most of the radical Salafi groups and their families, whom the Turkish occupation had settled in the region to change the demographic structure, have also been removed.

This development is regarded by many parties as an important success, as the residents of Afrin have been able to return to their lands without any armed confrontation.

The returning residents of Afrin insist on subjecting the region to an internal system aimed at developing local democracy. In this context, the matter is not limited to return alone, but also includes the proposal of concrete steps in the administrative and security fields.

Data indicate that a significant part of the returning youth have joined the Asayish (security) forces. In addition, the representation of local residents within security institutions, the restructuring of administrative mechanisms on a local basis, and the establishment of a new brigade composed of fighters from the sons of Afrin are on the agenda.

Now It Is the Turn of the Displaced from Sere Kaniye and Girê Spî

As for the return file, the issue of the return of the population to Sere Kaniye (Ras al‑Ain) and Girê Spî (Tel Abyad) remains unresolved. These two areas are among the core files included in the path of the 29 January agreement. Reports indicate that the radical Salafi groups supported by the Turkish state are not showing readiness to withdraw from those areas, which hinders progress on this file and leaves the situation of the population in limbo.

At present, the phase of counting the families who will return to Sere Kaniye has begun, along with some preliminary preparations. However, no concrete step towards return has yet been taken.

It appears that the future of the Sere Kaniye and Girê Spî files, just as happened in Afrin, will be determined not only by local actors but will also be linked to the Turkish state's policy towards the Kurds and its strategic approach to the region.

Military Integration and Contentious Issues

As for the process of integrating the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Syrian Democratic Forces into the Syrian army in the form of four new brigades, this has progressed relatively without major obstacles. One of the most important clauses of the agreement was the preservation of the QSD's institutional structure and its continued presence, especially in the Jazira and Kobani regions. This is seen as one of the first concrete and strategic steps on the path of integration.

Within this framework, four brigades have been officially recognised, three in the Jazira region and one in the Kobani region. In addition, the process of integrating the Asayish and police forces responsible for internal security has also begun. The new structure gains its importance from the fact that it consists largely of the region's youth and from its assumption of responsibility for local security.

However, one of the most controversial issues in the process is the status of women within the current military structure, as well as amendments concerning the total number of forces. Damascus's attempt to evaluate the forces subject to integration according to the army laws in force during the Baath era, and to limit the number to only 1,300 personnel, is a point of contention that the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Autonomous Administration do not accept.

Some parties criticise what they consider the imposition of the Baathist army structure by the interim government on the region, affirming the need not to ignore the needs of the regions and their representative strength.

QSD officials see this number as insufficient given the security conditions in the region, and demand that it be raised to no fewer than 3,000 personnel.

Due to these disagreements between the parties, this file has not yet been resolved and remains open for discussion.

Identity, Language, and Citizenship Rights

The file of identity, language, and cultural rights is also one of the most sensitive issues on the path of integration. After the agreement, despite high expectations regarding language rights in education and public life, practices on the ground do not meet these aspirations. The Kurdish language has been excluded from public signs, official documents, and educational institutions in many areas, with its continued imposition as an elective subject taught only for a few hours per week.

A clear tendency appears to reject the multilingual structure that the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria had adopted in its administrative system. One of the most prominent examples is the interim government's removal of administrative signs written in multiple languages and their replacement with signs written in Arabic only.

In the same manner, the Syriac language is being excluded from the public sphere, reflecting a unilateral approach that does not take into account the cultural and linguistic diversity of the region.

The discussions on identity and language are not limited to the educational field. The proposal to rename the city of Kobani, which holds special symbolism in the fight against ISIS, by its Arab name used during the Baath era (i.e., Ain al‑Arab), has sparked wide controversy in the region.

In addition, the interim government's insistence on changing the names of schools, hospitals, streets, and cities exclusively with Arabic designations has led to a state of discontent and anxiety among the population. The exclusion of local cultural identity from the public sphere is seen as a policy pushing towards cultural melting.

It is well known that one of the main motivations behind the Rojava Revolution was the rejection of policies of suppressing the Kurdish language and identity. Therefore, restricting the use of the Kurdish language in education and public life, and not recognising it as the language of an entire people, raises serious questions about the future of the integration path.

The citizenship file is also an area witnessing similar discussions. Thousands of Kurds who were deprived of citizenship during the Baath regime have recently been given the opportunity to reapply for Syrian nationality.

Despite the importance of this step, the continued definition of citizenship within the framework of the "Syrian Arab Republic" reveals that the interim government still largely adopts the traditional nation‑state vision based on Arab nationalism.

It is well known that the definition of a people by their own identity and the use of their language is the foundation for their enjoyment of political and democratic rights. However, Syria remains very far from this level, as these rights are not seen as a natural part of equal citizenship.

Therefore, guaranteeing cultural, linguistic, and citizenship rights is extremely important for the durability and stability of the integration process.

Women's Status and the Debate on Co‑Presidency

The status of women within the new system is one of the most sensitive issues on the integration path. Two fundamental issues arise in this context: the first concerns the position of the Women's Protection Units (YPJ) within the new defence structure, and the second concerns the future of the co‑presidency system, which is one of the most important governance models of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, based on the principle of equal representation of women and men in administrative institutions.

This model is one of the most prominent features of the Autonomous Administration's experience, but the question of its continuation within the integration process has not yet been decided.

Numerous reports indicate a tendency within the interim government that gives conservative religious interpretations a central role in public life, which affects women's participation in administrative and political work. This tendency is seen as contradicting the co‑presidency model and women's participation in decision‑making positions, raising concerns about the future of the gains women have achieved over the past years.

Similarly, debate continues as to whether the independent and special structure of the YPJ will be recognised within the new framework or not. These two issues are among the most sensitive files in the negotiations between the parties.

The Autonomous Administration and women's organisations affirm that protecting the political and social gains achieved by women over the past years is an essential condition for any democratic integration process.

In contrast, multiple reports indicate that the dominant tendencies within the interim government that give conservative religious interpretations a central role in shaping public policies are in contradiction with the co‑presidency model and with women's participation in administrative and political work.

It is clear that these two files will be among the most prominent axes of discussion in the coming period, as they are directly linked to the future of women's role and the nature of the political system to be built later.

Women's Gains and the Debate on the Women's Protection Units

The status of women and the future of the Women's Protection Units remain among the most controversial issues on the integration path. Despite statements that recent meetings between the YPJ and the Syrian Ministry of Defence were positive, the absence of any tangible results so far is noteworthy.

Women's organisations and the Autonomous Administration consider this delay to indicate that the process is being managed slowly and over an extended timeframe. The absence of a clear framework defining the YPJ's place within the new defence structure also raises concern among women's movements.

These organisations affirm that the integration process must not lead to regression from the political, social, and institutional gains women have achieved over the past years, but should instead ensure the continuation of their active participation in public life.

Women's movements in the region believe that the weak representation of women within government institutions and their insufficient participation in decision‑making mechanisms could create serious problems in the long term. For this reason, women are seen as one of the groups that approach the integration path with the greatest caution.

The ability to protect the political and social gains women have achieved over the past years is an issue that goes beyond the situation of the YPJ alone, as it is also viewed as an important indicator of the nature of the governance model that Syria might adopt in the future.

The question of whether these gains will be preserved or will regress is one of the most prominent determinants for understanding the direction the country may take in the coming period.

There is a new Kurdish generation that has grown up with the idea of self‑determination, alongside the growth of women's consciousness in the region. Therefore, it does not seem that this generation or the women will define themselves exclusively within the framework of the "Arab Syrian" or within an identity based solely on the patriarchal state.

Stability in Syria Is Possible Through Democratic Integration

In conclusion, this path contributes on the one hand to curbing new waves of migration, demographic changes, and the prospects of new conflicts; but on the other hand, it raises serious concerns regarding the regression of cultural and political rights and the insufficient recognition of women and minorities.

Moreover, the progress of the integration process without clear guarantees could lead to multiple imbalances and increase the risks of deepening instability in Syria.

These repercussions are not limited to Rojava alone, but are also felt in large areas such as the Druze and Alawite regions, as well as Deir ez‑Zor, Raqqa, and the outskirts of Damascus.

The manifestations of popular discontent are becoming more apparent, especially in administrative, economic, and security fields, where the population feels that their needs are not being met as required.

The integration of all regions in Syria on the basis of fair and democratic principles is a matter of great importance. The experience of the Autonomous Administration in Rojava in the field of self‑governance offers important opportunities for the future of the country. Transferring this experience to the national level within the framework of democratic integration could contribute to building a more inclusive and democratic Syria.

However, achieving this cannot be done through political agreements alone. Democratic integration requires a new social contract based on respect for diversity, guaranteeing women's rights, protecting cultural rights, and achieving economic justice.

In this context, the question of whether the gains achieved by the Kurds, women, and other social groups through the Rojava experience can be protected through democratic integration remains a crucial one.

Preserving the experience of the Autonomous Administration and its achievements, and transferring them to the national level, is not only important for Rojava alone, but could also contribute to building a more inclusive and pluralistic political structure across the country, paving the way for a democratic Syria based on broad participation and respect for diversity.